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Abstract
In the aftermath of the terror attack on the United States
on 11 September 2001, widespread concerns were raised
about security concerns related to access to Canada and
the United States of refugee claimants. Many new changes
were introduced after that event to improve the control
mechanisms to reduce the threat of terrorism. In the over-
lap between refugee and security concerns, particularly
with respect to the genuine fear of terrorism, this paper
will examine the controls in place and introduced after 11
September 2001 to restrict the entry and retention of ter-
rorists in association with the refugee determination proc-
ess. This paper will attempt to assess whether the refugee
determination process provides any significant opening for
terrorists to enter Canada or the United States.
Résumé
Dans la période qui a suivi les attentats terroristes du 11
septembre 2001 aux États-Unis, beaucoup d’inquiétudes
ont été exprimées autour de la question de sécurité liée à
l’entrée au Canada et aux États-Unis de demandeurs
d’asile. De nombreux changements ont été introduits à la
suite de ces évènements pour améliorer les mécanismes de
contrôle et réduire les risques de terrorisme. Dans le
chevauchement entre réfugiés et problèmes de sécurité,
particulièrement en ce qu’il s’agit de craintes fondées du
terrorisme, cet article se propose d’examiner les mesures
de contrôle qui ont été instaurées après le 11 septembre,
de pair avec le processus de reconnaissance du statut de
réfugié, afin de contrôler l’entrée de terroristes et leur
détention. L’article essayera de déterminer si le processus
de reconnaissance du statut de réfugié représente réelle-
ment une porte d’entrée de quelque importance permet-
tant aux terroristes d’entrer au Canada ou aux États-
Unis.
Security and Refugees
T
here are many areas in which immigration and, more
particularly, refugee issues overlap with security con-
cerns, especially since the Canadian system of selec-
tion and control presumes that the desirable can be
distinguished from the undesirable. This overlap with secu-
rity is particularly important in the case of refugees for,
unlike immigrants, Convention refugees are self-selected
and are generally permitted to become members of Canada
if they can prove that they are entitled to refugee status
according to the provisions of the International Refugee
Convention. However, even if adjudication has replaced a
system of selection, there are some controls in place to assess
any security risk related to potential refugee claimants, refugee
claimants, and persons given refugee status under the Conven-
tion. Those who pose security risks are inadmissible.1
These controls include: imposition of visa requirements
on travelers from specific countries coming to Canada;
pre-screening abroad to interdict2 undocumented arrivals
in partnership with transport companies,3 even if genuine
refugees are prevented from arriving in Canada to make a
claim; limiting the number of refugee arrivals by imple-
menting a “safe third country” mechanism,4 a provision
already in Canadian legislation that eliminates the refugee
claims of persons who transited through a country – spe-
cifically the United States – where they could have made a
refugee claim; the use of Advanced Passenger Information
(API) lists with full reservation details to facilitate interdic-
tion at airport ports of entry by disembarkation teams to
detect and prevent entry of improperly documented, un-
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documented, and unwanted arrivals; screening at ports of
entry to attempt to identify security risks5 in partnership
with other countries6 with which Canada shares informa-
tion,7 detention8 of suspect refugee claimants, subject to
review,9 without resorting to the current Australian system
of detaining all claimants;10 pre-screening of refugee claim-
ants by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service
(CSIS) to ensure that they are not security risks;11 and,
finally, removal12 of those refused refugee status or those
granted refugee status13 if they are deemed to be a security
risk. These efforts are enhanced by new high-tech systems
to detect security risks, such as the Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (AFIS) of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Canada (CIC). To ease the burden on and workload of
Immigration Control Officers (ICO), safe travellers can
now be expedited through immigration control where the
systems are in place by using the CANPASS, INSPASS, and
the new Expedited Passenger Processing System (EPPS), all
of which were designed to identify pre-approved low-risk
travelers expeditiously.
One foundation of this control system is documentation
– passports, visas. and refugee (and immigrant) identity
documents. Quite aside from the controls on refugees, one
of the major breaches in the control apparatus involves the
fraudulent use of passports. These include Canadian pass-
ports: there were 2,200 reported misuses of Canadian pass-
ports through fraudulent alteration, theft, borrowing, and
obtaining legitimate passports illegally14 between 1988 and
2000, according to a 27 September 2001 report of CIC. In
addition, corruption is used to buy visas.15 Some also argue
that the absence of a system of identity cards for immigrants
and refugees, prevalent in continental Europe, has also been
a problem (though such a system is now to be introduced
into Canada).
In the application of these enforcement mechanisms,
there are always constraints – financial, bureaucratic, legal –
as well as continuing debates between the degree of discre-
tion permitted and the desire to have all control rules
spelled out clearly and unequivocally. While control sys-
tems apply to undesirables of many kinds – criminals,
trafficked persons, war and other serious criminals, human
rights violators – this article is limited to the examination
of control mechanisms in place or recently introduced to
restrict the entry and retention of terrorists in association
with the refugee determination process, though in some
situations there are linkages between the control of terror-
ism and other control issues. For example, in the case of the
Tamil Tigers, there have been allegations of linkages be-
tween organized crime, money laundering, immigrant
smuggling operations and terrorism.16 In another example,
Ahmed Ressam, the terrorist convicted of planning to
bomb the Los Angeles airport, plotted bank robberies and
organized the fraudulent use of credit cards. This paper will
nevertheless focus on terrorism alone and by and large
avoid other issues of control.
Whatever the inherent limitations in any control system,
in the aftermath of September 11, widespread charges were
made17 both in the United States18 and in Canada19 that the
Canadian control system was porous and inefficient. In a
poll conducted by Léger Marketing in the aftermath of
September 11, 80 per cent of Canadians demanded stricter
controls over immigration.
However, in Chapter 2 of a report entitled Hands across
the Border (henceforth Hands),20 the Standing Committee
on Citizenship and Immigration, reporting on the effects
of September 11 on border and immigration issues to the
House of Commons, concluded: “Evidence to date indi-
cates that the attacks of September 11th were largely orches-
trated and carried out by a group of people who entered the
United States legally,” and had nothing to do with individu-
als attempting to enter Canada to win status as refugees.21
However, the Canadian Alliance qualified its overall en-
dorsement of the report as follows: “Capacity creates its
own demand, for where there is a weakness it will be
exploited. The ‘refugee system’ continues to be exploited by
non-refugees  and is a  grave security concern.”  And  on
December 7, 2001, the Toronto Star headlined its coverage
of Hands: “MPs Urge Crackdown on Refugees.” Is the
refugee control system porous and a security threat to
Canadians, or is this all hyperbolic rhetoric with little rela-
tionship to reality, and, even worse, an excuse and cover to
introduce stricter controls on the entry of genuine refugees
to Canada? The latter is the attitude of most individuals in
the refugee support community. Thus, while unequivocally
condemning the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Tow-
ers on 11 September 2001 and recognizing the need to take
defensive measures against future attacks, refugee and im-
migration support groups tend to view the terrorism scare
after September 11 as having been used as an excuse to
restrict and limit refugee entry into Canada even further
and with very little justification.
Are refugees a significant security issue or not?
Actual Security Threats and Refugees
As everyone knows, the September 11 attack on the World
Trade Towers was not the first terrorist attack targeting
North American people and property. One very early terror-
ist attack aimed at civilians was the 1985 bombing of an Air
India flight with 325 people, mostly Indo-Canadians,
aboard. Another airline attack on an India-bound plane was
just barely averted. Several Canadian Sikhs were recently
indicted for the Air India disaster.
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Other groups involved in terrorism have been supporters
of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Many Sri Lankan Tamils
arrived in Canada and were accepted as genuine refugees.
CSIS several years ago identified the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a terrorist organization guilty of
assassinations, suicide bombings, ethnic cleansing, torture
and rape. Further, the Security Intelligence Review Com-
mittee (SIRC) in its 1999-2001 Report (Ottawa 2000) rec-
ommended legislation to criminalize fundraising efforts for
terrorist and terrorist front organizations prevalent in Can-
ada. This was picked up in the National Post on 8 September
2001, just  prior  to September 11,  in  an article entitled
“Defunding Terrorism.” In October 2001, regulations were
introduced, pending legislation, to block money transfers
of terrorist organizations. On 7 November 2001, the Cana-
dian government formally declared LTTE to be a terrorist
organization.22 Further, CSIS purportedly named the Tamil
Eelam Society as a front for the LTTE. At the beginning of
December 2001, CIC denied further funding to the Tamil
Eelam Society of Canada, which provides services to Sri
Lankan refugees  and  migrants on the grounds  that the
society “was not meeting our requirements,” according to
the CIC spokesperson, Simon MacAndrew. He did not
specify what those requirements were.
Note that these organizations are not so much involved
in global terrorism as in support of homeland insurgency
movements (which may include the use of terrorism as a
strategy), for which they provide monies, lobbying, public
relations, sources of recruitment, and safe havens. How-
ever, in addition to the LTTE and various militant Sikh
groups from India,23 Canada has been used as a conduit for
global terrorism as well. Terrorist organizations active in
Canada include the al Qaeda network and the Algerian
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)24 as well as Hamas and
Hezbollah, which share some common goals with al
Qaeda.25 In the 1993 World Trade Towers attack in which
six people were killed, the chief organizer, Ramzi Yousef,
used forged Canadian immigration papers to gain access to
the United States. He went on to plan to sabotage twelve
U.S. planes in the Philippines, but that terrorist attack was
foiled.
However, the closest connection to Canada, refugees,
and security was another foiled  terrorist operation,  the
planned bombing of the Los Angeles airport. Thanks to
alert U.S. Customs officials who discovered explosives in
the trunk of Ahmed Ressam’s car on 14 December 1999
when he tried to cross into Washington State on a ferry
from Victoria, British Columbia, Ressam was captured.
Ressam had entered Canada as a refugee claimant from
Algeria, but had been unsuccessful in his refugee claim. He
returned to Canada on a false passport. His alleged partner,
the Algerian Samir Ait Mohamed, entered Canada in Oc-
tober of 1997 with a false Belgian passport and a fake name.
He too claimed refugee status, and had a hearing in August
1998 in Montreal but his claim was also rejected. Though
having no employment and living off welfare, he paid rent
of $1400 per month. He was picked up in Vancouver in July
2000 on an immigration warrant as a result of information
that came out of the trial of Ahmed Ressam. The United
States was not the only target the two had in mind. They
planned to place an explosive device in a gasoline truck at
the busy Laurier/Park intersection in Outrement, Mont-
real, a classy francophone area, because Ressam saw ultra-
orthodox Jews there due to the proximity of a large Hasidic
community. They also planned to set off a bomb on a busy
commercial block of Ste. Catherine Street in Montreal.26
However, the major targets have been in the United States.
Other than our own safety, as well as our concern for
American lives and our many shared values, we have other
motives than terrorism itself for focusing on immigration
and refugee issues as a security concern.
Economics as a Motive
Canada and the United States boasted the longest unde-
fended border in the world. The U.S. admits about 530
million people across its border each year, almost 200 mil-
lion from Canada; eighty million of these cross into the
United States on land. Prior to September 11, there were
only three hundred American agents patrolling the US/Ca-
nadian border and only seven hundred customs inspectors.
As a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), trade between the two countries grew from
$116.3 billion in 1985 to $409.8 billion in 2000. That trade
represented 85 per cent of Canadian exports in 2000, up
from 60 per cent thirty-five years earlier. At the same time,
to become more efficient, industry had instituted just-on-
time delivery so that auto assembly plants on both sides of
the border would have only from six hours to two days of
supplies on hand. About 3.75 million trucks per annum
cross the four bridges from Ontario to the U.S., about one
half via the Ambassador Bridge, which carries five thousand
trucks per day. Before September 11, Canadians and Ameri-
cans had been moving to integrate their economies even
more.
Other than the outpouring of sympathy for Americans
post-September 11, effects were most acutely felt at the long
delays at border points for both people and goods. Consider
that each automobile assembly line produces $1 million
worth of cars per hour. When backups at the U.S. border
create delays of days, the economic impact is enormous.27
Thus, efforts were expended in three very different direc-
tions. First, the smart-border declaration signed by Can-
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ada’s Foreign Minister John Manley and Paul Ridge, the
U.S. Director of Homeland Security, included provisions
for the long-standing efforts of Canada to create joint cus-
toms pre-clearance for commercial cargoes and jointly op-
erated customs facilities at remote border points; Canada
Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) has introduced a
self-assessment program (CSA) to facilitate the movement
of low-risk commercial traffic as well as a joint commercial
driver registration system. Second, efforts are being made
to speed up introduction of the CANPASS system (an
automatic pass to allow electronic identification for secure
Canadian travellers to return into Canada without being
checked by an ICO) and its successor, the Expedited Pas-
senger Processing System (EPPS), the technological means
that allow immigration and customs officers at airports to
identify pre-approved low risk travelers to create what the
Canadian Minister of National Revenue in 1996, David
Anderson, dubbed “a hassle-free border for honest travel-
ers and businesses.” Third, in addition to making the free
flow of goods and services as well as secure travelers across
the border easier, reinforced security measures were
stepped up along the border dividing Canada and the
United States. American agent numbers along the border
were tripled in the immediate aftermath of September 11,
initially from three hundred to nine hundred and then with
the addition of another six thousand Patrol Officers.28
Changes in Canadian Controls
to Enhance Security
A number of changes on the Canadian side have been made
to enhance security with respect to dealing with refugees that
assume refugees create security problems. Even before Sep-
tember 11, in March 2000 the House of Commons Report,
Refugee Protection and Border Security: Striking a Balance,
tabled in the House of Commons, connected the security
and refugee issues. Further, the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act (IRPA),29 includes clauses connecting refugee
and security issues. For example, clauses condensing the
security certificate protection procedure were drafted before
September 11 (though the Bill received Royal Assent on 1
November 2001 to come into force on June 28, 2002).
The Public Safety Act passed after September 11 includes
provisions in Part 9 amendments to the current Immigra-
tion Act for stopping a refugee proceeding if a claimant is
discovered to be a member of an inadmissible class or under
a removal order. In such cases, refugee determination pro-
ceedings before the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB)
could be suspended or terminated if there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the claimant is a terrorist, senior
official of a government engaged in terrorism, or a war
criminal. Another amendment allows immigration officers
to arrest and detain foreign nationals within Canada who
cannot satisfactorily identify themselves in the course of an
immigration proceeding, thus enabling CIC to enforce se-
curity concerns whether they arise at the border or within
Canada. However, CIC does not have to certify that some-
one detained was an individual who might facilitate acts of
terrorism. Other provisions require airlines to provide in-
formation on passengers before arrival. The Act provides
stiff increases in penalties for those who engage in human
trafficking and smuggling; those convicted would face fines
of up to $1 million and/or prison sentences for life. Finally,
the provision for the  new independent  appeal to those
refused refugee status – that had been provided for when
Elinor Caplan, the then Minister of Citizenship and Immi-
gration, introduced the new Immigration Act – was sus-
pended by her successor, Denis Coderre.
There have been a number of initiatives to harmonize
Canadian and American practices, though none can be said
to go so far as harmonizing immigration policies according
to George Bush’s directive on 29 October 2001 when he
ordered his officials to begin harmonizing customs and
immigration policies with those of Canada as well as Mex-
ico to ensure “maximum possible compatibility of immi-
gration, customs and visa policies.”30 In addition to visa
screening abroad and pre-clearance of flights abroad, two
key areas of co-operation between Canada and the United
States are in the process of being introduced with respect to
refugees – the creation of a common list of countries ex-
empt from visa requirements and the introduction of a safe
third-country accord.
A day after Canada and the U.S. signed a joint border and
immigration accord in December of 2001, Canada imposed
visa requirements on the following eight countries: Domin-
ica, Grenada, Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu (six
small island states), as well as Zimbabwe and Hungary. The
island states are used to buy passports or, in the case of
Nauru, serve as a holding centre for Australian refugee
claimants. Hungary was included because, although a small
percentage of Roma have been accepted as refugees, Roma
from  Hungary continually arrive  in  Canada to become
refugee claimants. However, the inclusion of Zimbabwe
supports the fears of the refugee support community since
1,652 Zimbabweans made claims in 2000 and the majority
(70 per cent) of claimants have been successful. In the news
release of 4 December 2001, the then Minister of Citizen-
ship and Immigration, Elinor Caplan, explained that, “The
decision to impose a visa for Zimbabweans reflects our
concern with improperly documented travellers to Can-
ada.” The Canadian High Commissioner to Zimbabwe was
quoted in the Zimbabwe Independent that same day as
saying the visa was imposed to ensure “that only those
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people with genuine reasons are allowed entry to Canada.”
But most were genuine refugees! Would the Canadian High
Commission issue a visa if the applicant in Zimbabwe said
that his reason was a desire to make a refugee claim? Is it
any surprise that the refugee support community believes
that such provisions would, and were probably intended to,
deter the arrival of genuine refugees even though there has
been no evidence of a security threat from Zimbabweans?
The biggest worry for the refugee support community
has been that the United States and Canada have finally
agreed to implement the safe third country provision al-
ready in Canadian legislation. Since 75 per cent of refugee
claimants in Canada arrive through the United States, refu-
gee support groups either totally oppose its implementa-
tion or insist on conditions. For example, Amnesty
International, in a press release on 23 May 2002, demands
that individuals denied access to the Canadian system in
accordance with a safe third country agreement not be
subjected to the American expedited removal process and
summarily removed for want of a valid or suitable docu-
mentation, that internment only be employed if necessary
but always in accord with international standards and never
applied to children, and that those fleeing gender-based
violence not be denied access. The Canadian Council for
Refugees (CCR) is much more vociferously opposed to
introducing a safe third country provision and is running a
campaign against its introduction with the misleading title
of the “None Is Too Many” provision.31
The Chrétien/Clinton Canada-USA Accord on Our
Shared Border, of February 1995, included a provision for
implementing a safe third country provision. The Septem-
ber 11 attack gave the absence of any true effort in that area
a new impetus. On 12 December 2001, Canada and the U.S.
signed a Joint Statement of Cooperation on Border Security
and Regional Migration Issues, otherwise known as the
Smart Border Declaration,32 that included a commitment
to work towards a safe third country agreement that would
significantly reduce or bar access to Canada for refugee claim-
ants passing through the U.S. The agreement stated that,
We plan to develop the capacity to share such information and
to begin discussions on a safe third-country exception to the
right to apply for asylum. Such an arrangement would limit the
access of asylum seekers, under appropriate circumstances, to
the system of only one of the two countries.
This provision requires that if claimants passed through a
country where they were entitled to make a refugee claim,
then they would not be allowed to make a claim in the
country of arrival but, instead, would be sent back to that
country to make a claim.
While the Citizenship and Immigration Minister, Denis
Coderre, was reported in the 2 May 2002 Globe and Mail to
have promised that no agreement was possible unless the
Agreement “guarantees the United States will treat the
asylum seekers much like Canada does,” on 6 May John
Manley, who was charged by the Prime Minister with co-
ordinating all matters related to security with the United
States, indicated that a draft agreement was ready and
would be signed in June at Kananaskis by George Bush and
Jean Chrétien in accordance with the thirty-point action
planned agreed upon between the two countries at the end
of 2001, which included joint security clearances for refugee
applicants, coordination of visa policies, sharing of infor-
mation on passenger manifests, and pre-clearance of ex-
ports headed across the border. At the time of this writing,
the details of any draft agreement are not available.
There were other changes affecting refugees that did not
involve legislative changes or implementation of existing
legislation. Paul Martin’s 10 December 2001 budget allo-
cated $395 million to speed up and enhance refugee and
immigration screening. A sum of $500 million was set aside
for detention33 and speeding up the removal process.
(Much larger amounts – $1.2 billion – went into high tech
devices to speed up the movement of goods and people,
such as the Primary Automated Lookout System (PALS) for
land border passenger traffic, designed to take care of 70
million of the 80 million Canadians who cross the Cana-
dian/American border by land each year, and the Canadian
Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA), a new author-
ity set up to oversee security at Canadian airports.) New
immigrant and refugee claimants would henceforth be re-
quired to carry a fraud resistant “Maple Leaf” identity card
to be paid for by a $50 fee charged to the refugee claimant.34
The cards would be encoded with an identifier, such as a
fingerprint, and those carrying the card would use it at ports
of entry or to check in periodically at designated kiosks
where they would swipe the card to see if it matched their
biometric identifier. The cards would also be used for medi-
cal and welfare purposes to prevent fraud and double-dip-
ping. The CCR submission to the Standing Committee on
Citizenship and Immigration of the House of Commons
complained about the “excessive and intrusive demands for
information” from immigrants applying for a permanent
resident card because the government had no business
asking these individuals who their employers were or where
they went to school for the last five years, presumably based
on some ostensible security need. The CCR also com-
plained about the lack of a mechanism to apply to the
Minister for an exemption and to ensure exemption appli-
cations are dealt with in a fair manner with respect to the
broad provisions concerning inadmissibility on the
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grounds of security, human rights violations, or participa-
tion in organized crime.
The fears about the direction of these reports, legislative
initiatives, and budgetary allocations were accentuated for
some members of the refugee support community when the
Supreme Court handed down its ruling on the
Manickavasagam Suresh, a forty-five-year-old Tamil citi-
zen of Sri Lanka. Suresh entered Canada on 5 October 1990
and was accepted as a Convention refugee on 11 April 1991.
When Suresh applied for landed status in the summer of
1991, the Solicitor General of Canada and the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration declared him inadmissible on
security grounds, on the grounds that Suresh had been a
fundraiser for the LTTE and was, therefore, a member of
an alleged terrorist organization. On 18 January 2000, the
Federal Court of Appeal ruled that:
It is permissible in defined circumstances to deport a suspected
terrorist to a country even though, in the words of the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or  Punishment, … there are substantial  grounds for
believing that refoulement would expose that person to a risk of
torture.”35
In effect, refugees could be sent back to potential torture
under certain circumstances. After the attack on the World
Trade Towers, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered a
ruling that upheld the right of the government to deport
Suresh as long as the government observed procedural
proprieties. Amnesty International had all along criticized
any policies or court rulings for excluding “serious crimi-
nals, terrorists, human rights violators, traffickers and se-
curity risks” if they would face serious human rights
violations such as torture. AI, in a press release dated 7 April
2002, interpreted the Convention Against Torture to which
Canada was a signatory as absolutely forbidding return to
a state where the individual “would be in danger of being
subjected to torture." The Supreme Court determined that it
was wholly within the government’s prerogative to determine
whether there was any significant danger as long as proper
procedures in making that determination were followed.
In order to assess whether such measures are necessary
and appropriate, it is incumbent that the security threat be
understood in order to assess its relationship to the refugee
process.
Terrorism
The September 11 events were not the first terrorist attacks
aimed at U.S. targets by al Qaeda or its predecessors. The
1983 truck bomb in Beirut, the 1988 crash of Pan American
flight 103, the 1989 UTA crash in which 171 were killed, the
previous attempt on the World Trade Towers in 1993 when
six were killed, the 1995 bombing of the Military Coopera-
tion Program building in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the 1998
bombings of American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen – all of
these had been part of a growing pattern of global terrorism
fostered by radical Islamist groups aimed at the U.S. The
September 11 attack was simply the most audacious and
sophisticated with the greatest loss of lives and property.
In the September 11 attacks when American airlines were
hijacked and used as explosive missiles to destroy or at-
tempt to destroy American buildings  of  great  symbolic
significance in New York and Washington, two targeting
the two towers of the World Trade Centre and two targeting
the Pentagon and possibly the White House, the four teams
of terrorists – nineteen men in all36 – demonstrated that
they had been highly prepared and coordinated. For the
success of the attack depended on well structured surveil-
lance, clear and unequivocal decisions and planning, and
an effective logistic support operation. The terrorists had to
have knowledge of airport security and know that transcon-
tinental flights carried a low passenger load on Tuesday
mornings but also a high fuel load after takeoff. As we have
learned from a number of Hollywood terrorist movies, a
well-trained attack team capable of using swift initial vio-
lence to intimidate, and to take advantage of past habits
during airline hijacking that recommended co-operation
rather than resistance, is necessary. It was an operation that
required close coordination in time. And it depended on
some of the hijackers taking enough flying lessons over time
to be able at least to steer these large aircraft towards their
pre-selected targets.
All these terrorist attacks have been made up of low
tech/high tech combinations. They are high tech when they
use explosives that are more compact, more lethal, and
easier to make, including turning civilian planes into mis-
siles, but low tech when they employ box cutters to hijack
the planes. These terrorists seem to have no moral qualms
about killing innocents, including women and children. In
some cases, women and children are even targeted. The
attacks have increasingly become more brutal and indis-
criminate with larger numbers of casualties following a
multiple coordinated attack. What is most important, the
attackers do not require close direction and supervision,
but have become self-guided missiles capable of keeping
their focus on their targets after long separations of time
and distance from the centre of operation. They are better
educated and backed by cadres that number in the thou-
sands in a network with a global reach. Muslim extremists
committed to messianic terrorism are behind 90 per cent
of these attacks. Intelligence on them is difficult to acquire
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since al Qaeda consists of highly organized teams relatively
isolated into tightly closed cells, but whose operations de-
pend on loosely structured networking versus strict hierar-
chical command and control. In this messianic terrorism,
the terrorists believe they are opposing conspiracies of pow-
erful, hostile forces out to destroy and eliminate what they
value, while their cause is all-good, all-powerful, and guar-
anteed victory.
It is one thing to describe and characterize these terrorist
attacks on which there is general agreement. It is another to
explain them. Commentators generally fall into one of five
groups in accounting for this terrorism: (1) those who see
this terrorism as an expression of irrationality,37 (2) those
who view it as an expression of one side of a struggle, a sort
of civil war within Islam between tradition and modernity
into which the United States has been drawn;38 (3) those
who see America as the main target because of what Amer-
ica has done in the past;39 (4) those who see it as a war of
civilization aimed at America because of what America
stands for;40 and (5) those who see this terrorism not as an
act of war, either civil, against a state, or against a civiliza-
tion, but as a crime against humanity.41 However, whatever
the explanation or interpretation adopted, they all focus on
strategies for attacking the problem in its home base rather
than defending against the terrorists through homeland
security.
Linking Terrorism and Refugees
It is clear that terrorism aimed at North America is a real
threat and both aggressive and defensive measures must be
taken to combat it. Though some of those defensive meas-
ures include enhanced immigration controls, there is virtu-
ally no evidence linking global terrorism with refugees.
Global terrorists have not exploited the refugee determina-
tion system to gain access to Canada, though several tried.
There is an obvious reason for this. Entering Canada via the
refugee stream exposes a refugee claimant to authorities, to
a security clearance, to divulging information in filling out
a  refugee  claim form. Any  sophisticated terrorist would
reasonably be expected to avoid such an exposure. Further,
there are far easier options for gaining entry into either
Canada or the United States.
There is plenty of evidence, however, that indicates that
homeland insurgency movements characterized by vio-
lence have used the refugee determination system as a way
for their supporters to gain entry into Canada and as fronts
for organizing support for those insurgent terrorist groups.
Actions are underway to undercut that diaspora support for
insurgency movements abroad that use terrorism as a key
tool.
There is even more evidence that the security threat –
which is real and palpable – has been used as a cover to cut
down on the entry of refugee claimants coming to Canada
whether through visa controls or through the proposed
implementation of a safe third-country system. If there are
justifications for this indirect cutback by greater restrictions
on access to the system, one of them is not security; the
security issue is a rationale rather than a reason.
Notes
1. Part 3, 14 of the regulations registered June 11 (cf. CIC web
site, online: <http://www.cic.qc.ca>) states that a foreign na-
tional or permanent resident is inadmissible, “if the Board
determines that the person has engaged in terrorism or b) a
Canadian court determines that such persons have been in-
volved in the commission of a terrorism offence in accordance
with 34 (1) (c) of the Act." Also inadmissible are those deter-
mined by the Board, Canadian courts, or the international
criminal court to be guilty of crimes against humanity. Ac-
cording to section 35 (1) (b) of the regulations, prescribed
officials from states that persecute their own citizens may not
be allowed to enter. These include heads of state, government
ministers or members of the governing council, senior advis-
ers, senior civil servants, senior military officers and senior
members of the intelligence and security services, ambassa-
dors and senior diplomatic officials, and  members  of the
judiciary.
2. Prior to September 11, Canada had forty-four Immigration
Control Officers (ICOs) posted abroad. The December 2001
budget allocated increased funds to deploy additional ICOs
abroad, perhaps to be enhanced by posting CSIS and RCMP
officers abroad as well.
3. Over the five years preceding September 11, Canada inter-
dicted an average of 6,600 individuals each year and prevented
them from travelling to Canada.
4. In the interim, direct-backs – that is, sending refugee asylum
applicants back to the United States to await an initial hearing
– have been used as an alternative to detention when initial
checks could not be completed expeditiously, such as when
proper documents or a senior Immigration Control Officer
(ICO) was not available.
5. This involves profiling based on countries to which they trav-
eled,  source countries,  employment and  non-employment
backgrounds, past studies, etc. Cf. the Globe and Mail, 19
September 2001, p. 1, for a story on a CIC document marked,
“Protected: Canadian Eyes Only – for Official Eyes Only.”
6. The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) have been
created as multi-agency cross-border intelligence law enforce-
ment teams to share information and coordinate actions
against terrorists, illegal migration, and cross-border criminal
activity reinforced by the use of a number of high tech devices.
7. In the one area of overseas intelligence in which Canada has a
capacity,  signals  intelligence  or SIGINT, Canadian  signals
intelligence evidently intercepted encrypted messages among
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international terrorist groups indicating a renewed terrorist
assault on the U.S., though CSIS erroneously received the
credit. (Cf. Jerry Seper, “FBI Alert Based on Coded Message,”
Washington Times, 1 November 2001, and Scott Simmie,
“Why Spy Agency Had Key Role in Terror Alert?” Toronto
Star, 1 November 2001.) This sharing of information was
consistent with the priorities of then Immigration Minister
Elinor Caplan, who had said, “We need to be able to develop
a network where we share information overseas so that we can
better protect our continent” to stop “those who pose any kind
of security threat from coming to Canada or the U.S. to begin
with.” (Cf. Allan Thompson of the Ottawa Bureau of the
Toronto Star, who also reported on 31 October 2001 that
Canada and the U.S. were edging towards establishing a com-
mon security perimeter by establishing joint screening proce-
dures to stop security threats at the source.)
8. In the Canadian government May 2002 response to Hands, the
claim was made that detention is only used “when absolutely
necessary, i.e. when persons pose a threat to public safety, are
considered to be a flight risk, or are undocumented and unco-
operative in establishing their identity." (emphasis added, p.
4)
9. In Canada, a review of the circumstances of detainees occurs
within forty-eight hours and then again within seven days and
every thirty days thereafter.
10. The UNHCR Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards
related to the Detention of Asylum Seekers view detention as
inherently undesirable and should not be used as a deterrence
measure or to punish asylum seekers who have entered a
country illegally. The Guidelines forbid the automatic use of
detention, and provide that detention only be resorted to in
cases of necessity as an exception, and should be imposed on
reasonable grounds, and, even then, insist that it should not
be unduly prolonged. However, since the “reasonable
grounds” include opportunities to verify identity, to deter-
mine the elements on which the claim for refugee status is
based, cases where asylum seekers have destroyed travel docu-
ments or used fraudulent documents, or in cases of security
concerns, most cases could easily fall under one of these
exceptions even if the procedural safeguards are in place,
such as providing detention orders and reasons in the lan-
guage the detainee can understand, providing access to legal
counsel, providing for a review of any decision, and allow-
ing the detainee to challenge the reasons before a review
tribunal.
11. SIRC in its 2000–2001 Report (Ottawa, 2001) noted that it
could take up to as long as two years to complete a background
check on a refugee claimant. As the Report also notes, much
of the time taken up by intelligence liaison concerns immigra-
tion, visa, and refugee clearances. However, in spite of the
Global Case Management System of CIC (GCMS) and its Field
Operational Support System (FOSS), the lack of coordination
among CSIS, CIC, and the RCMP has impeded the proper
identification of refugee claimants who are suspect, according
to Adrian Humphries (“Caplan Made Promises She Could
Not Keep,” National Post, 3 November 2001). The designation
of liaison officers from CIC, CSIS (SLOs) and the RCMP (LOs)
was intended to expedite communication and co-operation.
Further, the Canadian government in its May 2002 response
to Hands committed itself to fair and equitable treatment, the
development of national standards for pre-screening, and the
training of officers in cross-cultural understanding.
12. CIC employs 350 inland enforcement officers (IEOs) to inves-
tigate, remove, and escort deportees.
13. Including humanitarian cases as well as Convention refugee
status, Canada admits about 58 per cent of refugee claimants
compared to 52 per cent for the U.S.
14. Bertoliny Eugene, an enterprising student at Concordia Uni-
versity, testified at the trial of Ahmed Ressam (where Ressam
was convicted of terrorist activity for trying to bomb Los
Angeles airport) that he had obtained five other passports
“easily” in addition to the one he supplied Ressam, and only
received $300 for each of them. Another supplier testified that
passports were very easy to obtain, but he sold them for $800
each. The Algerian co-conspirator with Ahmed Ressam, Samir
Ait  Mohammed, using false Canadian passports, allegedly
tried to arrange the entry into Canada from Germany of four
terrorists who had trained with Ahmed Ressam in al Qaeda
camps in Afghanistan.
15. Canada has a much smaller problem of control than the U.S.
for we admit only six hundred thousand per year as students,
tourists, and business people, while the U.S., with its more
universal visa requirement, issues over thirty million visas.
16. In comparing foreign intelligence with domestic intelligence
related to control, the only issue that does not overlap is
perhaps nuclear proliferation, and in terms of domestic intel-
ligence, even this is a problem when the focus is on non-state
actors. All the other issues set forth as priorities by the federal
Cabinet in 1991 have a domestic security counterpart relevant
to domestic intelligence: international terrorism and ethnic
and  religious conflict  in  which the diaspora  communities
generally are significantly involved. These security priorities
are: nuclear proliferation, illegal migration, transnational or-
ganized crime, economic espionage, and trade intelligence.
17. A backgrounder, “Canada’s Asylum System: A Threat to
American Security?” by James Bissett, makes the claim that the
refugee determination system is a security threat. Since Bissett
is a former Canadian ambassador and was the Executive Di-
rector of Canada’s Immigration Service from 1985 to 1990, his
charges carry some initial credibility. (Cf. online:
<http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/back402.html>.) In the ar-
ticle posted on that site, Bissett says: “Canada has intro-
duced some far-reaching security legislation since the
attacks in the United States, but the weakest link — Can-
ada’s asylum system — has not been addressed . . . the
security of both countries remains vulnerable to a Canadian
asylum system that seems designed to openly welcome po-
tential terrorists.”
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18. Cf. D.L. Brown, “Attacks Force Canadians to Face Their Own
Threat,” Washington Post, 23 September 2001; J. Bagole, et al.,
Wall Street Journal, 24 September 2001.
19. Cf. Stewart Bell, “A Conduit for Terrorists,” National Post, 13
September 2001, Diane Francis, “Our Neighbour’s Upset over
Our Loose Refugee System,” Financial Post, 22 September 2001.
20. Canada. Hands Across the Border: Working Together at Our
Shared Border and Abroad to Ensure Safety, Security and Effi-
ciency, House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizen-
ship and Immigration Report (Ottawa, December 2001). The
Canadian government response was published in May 2002
and is available  on the internet, online: <http://www.cic.
gc.ca/english/pub/hab/htlm>.
21. An American INS Bulletin in October reported that thirteen
of the nineteen hijackers entered the U.S. on legal business or
a visitor visa; there were no records for the others.
22. See also Ravindra Aryasinha, “Terrorism, the LTTE and the
Conflict in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Conflict Security & Develop-
ment I:2, 2001, 25–50.
23. Other terrorist organizations that use Canada as a base for
support, recruitment, funds, and a safe haven for homeland
insurgency include the Real IRA and the Kurdistan Workers
Party from Turkey (PKK).
24. The Algerian terrorists were linked with al Qaeda by John
Solomon, “Authorities Identify Six Terror Centres in US,”
Jerusalem  Post, 18 November 2001, and by  Susan  Sachs,
“Merger Spread al-Qaeda Tentacles,” New York Times, 21
November 2001. As we shall see, two of the terrorists associ-
ated with al Qaeda who have been caught came from the
Algerian group. Further, Nizar Ben Muhammad Nassr Nawar,
who killed himself along with nineteen others, twelve of whom
were German tourists, on 11 April 2002 when he used an old
refrigerated truck filled with propane to blow up an ancient
synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia, was evidently part of the Alge-
rian al Qaeda cell based in Montreal. However, Canadian
officials could find no record that he had tried to immigrate
to Canada or had applied for refugee status. (Cf. Toronto Star,
9 June 2002, A1 and A12.)
25. There were other potential cases involving Palestinians, only
a few of which have come to light. For example, just prior to
September 11, Ary Hussein came to Canada to file a refugee
claim. He ditched his papers before arriving at Pearson airport
and landed behind bars after confessing to having once par-
ticipated in a kidnapping. (Cf. the report of Bill Schiller in the
Toronto Star on 23 November 2001.)
26. This information became available in early December 2001 as
a result of a freedom of information action launched by the
Globe and Mail.
27. As Lunman reported in the Globe and Mail of 17 October 2001,
“Waits at U.S. Border Hurting Economy, B.C. Premier Says –
He Urges PM to Push for North American Security Perime-
ter.” Kuitenbrouwer in the National Post of 29 October 2001
wrote, “Perimeter will save trade: CEOs – 74% say we need
common security rules as worries mount over access to key
market.”
28. What was once the longest undefended border was becoming
a security barrier. U.S. Border Patrol official Robert Finley,
chief agent for a nearly five-hundred-mile stretch of  the
United States-Canadian border from the Continental Divide
in Montana to North Dakota, was quoted in an article by Sam
Howe Verhovek in the 4 October 2001 New York Times as
saying, “There are all kinds of means to get across the prairie
illegally. People use bicycles here; they drive in on snowmo-
biles. They come over by horseback.” Compare this to the eight
thousand American agents along the U.S.-Mexican border. Cf.
Sam Howe Verhovek in the 4 October 2001 New York Times,
where he began by contrasting the former focus on preventing
people from wading across the Rio Grande or hiking across
the scorching desert that borders the U.S. and Mexico, to a new
focus on securing the longest unguarded border.
29. Cf. Canada. Bill C-11: An act respecting immigration to Can-
ada and the granting of refugee protection to persons who are
displaced, persecuted or in danger (Ottawa, 1 Nov. 2001). See
also Canada. Bill C-36: An Act to amend the Criminal Code,
the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the Proceeds
of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and other Acts, and to enact
measures respecting the registration of charities, in order to
combat terrorism, 37th Parliament, 1st session (Ottawa, 2001).
30. According to Bush’s spokesperson, Campbell Clark, as quoted
in “Bush Aims to Tighten Continent’s Borders – U.S. Bid to
Harmonize Immigration and Customs Puts Heat on
Chretien” (Globe and Mail, 30 October 2001).
31. Catherine Balfour widely circulated an e-mail calling on all
Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) members and friends
to organize a media blitz on U.N. World Refugee Day, June
20, over the prospective “safe third country” agreement with
the U.S. NGOs misleadingly dubbed the provision the None Is
Too Many agreement after the bookby the same name by
Irving Abella and Harold Troper documenting the efforts of
the Canadian Immigration Department during the 1930s and
1940s to keep Jews out of Canada. CCR argues that “the evidence
shows the United States IS NOT A SAFE THIRD COUNTRY for
refugees!” (Cf. online: <http://www.ccr~web.net>)
32. Previous meetings, such as Border Vision and the Cross-Bor-
der Crime Forum, were movements in this direction.
33. Before September 11, about eight thousand people were de-
tained by immigration for an average of sixteen days; the U.S.
average detention time was twice as long, and twenty times
more people were detained, a reflection largely of the activity
on the Mexican border. Grounds for detention in both coun-
tries are similar, including: the security risk posed; the fear that
the individual will disappear underground; and the need to
confirm the identity of the person detained, though Canada is
less likely to detain refugees based on the latter need.
34. Provisions for a Permanent Resident Card were spelled out in
the regulations registered June 11 although the official version
was not available until June 17 on the CIC web site,
<http://www.cic.gc.ca>. As stated in the regulations, “The
implementation of the Act on June 28, 2002, will bring with it
the introduction of the permanent resident (PR) card that will
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provide new and  existing permanent  residents with clear,
secure proof of their status. The PR card will automatically be
issued to all permanent residents who are new to Canada as of
June 28, 2002. Permanent residents already in Canada will be
able to apply for the card this fall according to a schedule based
on their year of landing. After December 31, 2003, all perma-
nent residents will need the PR card to re-enter Canada after
traveling abroad.”
35. The Supreme Court  did not overturn  the  second  case of
Mansour Ahani because the Supreme Court ruled that the
government had followed proper procedures in considering
him a security risk and weighing the risk of torture upon his
return.
36. The theory is that twenty men were intended to hijack the
planes, but a French-Moroccan flight student, Zacarias Mous-
souai, was detained by INS on 17 August 2001 because his
flight instructor at an Eagan, Minnesota, flight school became
suspicious because of his persistent efforts in training on flight
maintenance operations on the flight simulator.
37. Cf. Bruce Cumings, Professor of History at the University of
Chicago. His views are articulated in an e-essay solicited and
distributed by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) in
the United States, entitled “Some Thoughts Subsequent to
September 11th. See also James Der Derian, Professor of Inter-
national Relations at Brown University and Professor of Po-
litical Science at the University of Massachusetts, whose views
are represented in an e-essay, also distributed by SSRC, enti-
tled “Before, After, and In Between,” as well as in remarks
made at a symposium sponsored by the Watson Institute for
International Studies at Brown University in the aftermath of
September 11 and reprinted in a special issue of Briefings:
Perspectives on 9.11.2001 published by the Watson Institute.
38. Cf. Timur Kuran, Professor of Economics and Law, and King
Faisal Professor of Islamic Thought and Culture, at the Uni-
versity of Southern California, who offers an economic inter-
pretation in his SSRC e-essay, “The Religious Undercurrents
of Muslim Economic Grievances.” See also Farish A. Noor of
the Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) in
Malaysia who articulates a more cultural interpretation of the
civil war within Islam in another SSRC e-essay entitled “The
Evolution of ‘Jihad’ in Islamist Political Discourse: How a
Plastic Concept Became Harder.”
39. Cf. Mahmood Mamdami, Professor of Anthropology at Co-
lumbia University, in his SSRC e-essay, “Good Muslim, Bad
Muslim: An African Perspective;” and Tariq Modood, Profes-
sor of Sociology and Director of the University Centre for the
Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at the University of Bristol,
in his SSRC e-essay, “Muslims in the West: A Positive Asset.”
40. Cf. Luis Rubio, General Director of the Centre for Research
for Development (CIDAC) in Mexico City, in his SSRC e-es-
say, “Terrorism and Freedom: An Outside View;” and David
Held, Professor of Political Science at the London School of
Economics, in his SSRC e-essay, “Violence and Justice in a
Global Age.”
41. Cf. Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights; her views are expressed in the USIP Peace-
Watch of October/December 2001 (p. 7); see also Thomas J.
Bierstecker, Director of the Watson Institute for International
Studies and Henry R. Luce Professor of Transnational Organi-
zations at Brown University, in “Perspectives on 9.11.2001; A
Special Issue,” Briefings, Summer/Fall 2001. Finally, look at
Janet Abu-Lughod, Professor Emerita of the Department of
Sociology at the New School in New York City, in her SSRC
e-essay, “After the WTC Disaster: The Sacred, the Profane, and
Social Solidarity.”
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